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This year, 1989, may become known as the Ethics Year as ac-
counts of questionable behavior of public, governmental and lead-
ing business figures, many of whom are lawyers, proliferate in the
media. Questionable ethical behavior leads to the erosion of public
confidence in the legal profession and demonstrates the need for
increased scrutiny of the conduct of lawyers in both their profes-
sional and private capacities.1
This survey covers significant changes to the Virginia Code of
Professional Responsibility (the "Code") 2 enacted between 1987
and 1989, and also discusses several critical Virginia disciplinary
decisions. In addition, the survey will address several cases of na-
tional concern which have considered issues relative to a lawyer's
professional responsibilities: mandatory reporting of another law-
yer's misconduct; advertising and solicitation; acceptance of invol-
untary court appointments; and the legality of mandatory bar
membership and residency requirements.
* Assistant Bar Counsel, Virginia State Bar; B.A., 1962, Queens College of the City Uni-
versity of New York; J.D., 1984, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
1. See, e.g., In re Sipes, 297 S.C. 531, 377 S.E.2d 574 (1989) (lawyer serving as "cookie
chairperson" for daughter's Girl Scout troop suspended for one year for misappropriating
$1,800 of cookie sales proceeds).
2. VA. Sup. CT. R. pt. 6, § II. As one of the few professions granted the authority to regu-
late and monitor the behavior of its members, the organized bars of individual states have
developed and adopted codes of professional responsibility and procedures for ensuring
compliance with those codes. After its creation by the General Assembly in 1938, the Vir-
ginia State Bar recommended that the Supreme Court of Virginia adopt the 1908 American
Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility and subsequently its 1969 prog-
eny with certain modifications. The Code and its revisions were adopted for the protection
of the public and the guidance of lawyers under the power of the Supreme Court of Virginia
to govern lawyers' professional conduct and to prescribe procedures for disciplining, sus-
pending, and disbarring attorneys. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3909 (Repl. Vol. 1988). The Vir-
ginia State Bar acts as the administrative arm of the court overseeing adherence to the code.
Id. § 54.1-3910.
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II. REVISIONS TO RULES OF COURT
A. Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility
1. Maintaining or Renewing License to Practice Law
A 1987 amendment to Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-1013 extended
the prohibition against making materially false statements in con-
nection with an application for admission to the Virginia State Bar
(the "Bar") to include any "materially false statement in any certi-
fication required to be filed as a condition of maintaining or re-
newing his license to practice law."'4 Thus, disciplinary proceed-
ings would attach to any materially false statement made to attest
to a lawyer's participation in such activities as Continuing Legal
Education programs, the mandatory course in professionalism, and
more recently, in the required statement as to malpractice/profes-
sional liability insurance coverage.
2. Obligation to Report Misconduct
Disciplinary Rule 1-1031 mandates that "[a] lawyer having infor-
mation indicating that another lawyer has committed a violation of
the Disciplinary Rules that raises a substantial question as to that
lawyer's fitness to practice law in other respects shall report such
information to the appropriate professional authority, except as
provided in DR 4-101. ' '6 Apparently to ensure the efficacy of the
program jointly established by the Bar and the Virginia Bar Asso-
ciation which assists lawyers who are substance abusers, "Lawyers
Helping Lawyers", DR 1-103 was amended in 1987 to exempt pro-
gram participants from the mandatory reporting requirements of
the rule as they apply to participants' use of illegal substances.'
3. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-101 (1983).
4. Id. DR 1-101(B) (emphasis added).
5. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103 (1987).
6. Id. (DR 4-101 protects confidences and secrets gained in the attorney-client
relationship).
7. Id.; see also VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Ops. 977 and 1004 (1987).
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3. Aiding the Unauthorized Practice of Law
A basic tenet of the Code is that a lawyer shall not aid a non-
lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law." Disciplinary Rule 3-
101 was amended in 1987 to specify the capacity in which a lawyer,
whose license has been suspended or revoked for professional mis-
conduct, may be employed by a law firm. Subsection B provides
that a lawyer, law firm or professional corporation may not employ
the disciplined lawyer in any capacity during the period of suspen-
sion or revocation if the lawyer had been associated with that indi-
vidual, firm or corporation on or after the date of the acts which
resulted in the suspension or revocation.9 Additionally, DR 3-
101(C) prohibits any firm, which permissibly employs the disci-
plined lawyer as a consultant, law clerk or legal assistant, from rep-
resenting any client earlier represented either by the disciplined
lawyer or by any lawyer with whom he practiced at or after the
time of the acts which resulted in suspension or revocation.' 0
4. Prosecutorial Disclosure of Evidence to Defendant
In Read v. Virginia State Bar," the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that a prosecutor's failure to timely disclose to a defendant
that a witness' testimony had changed, thereby exculpating the de-
fendant, did not violate DR 8-102(A)(4).12 In response to Read, the
court revised the rule effective July 1, 1989. In a broad application
of the Brady rule,'" DR 8-101(A)(4) now requires:
(A) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal liti-
gation shall ... (4) [m]ake timely disclosure to counsel for the de-
fendant, or to the defendant if he has no counsel, of the existence of
evidence, known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer, that
8. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-101(A) (1987).
9. Id. DR 3-101(B).
10. Id. DR 3-10(C); see VSB, Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1044 (1988) (em-
ployment of disbarred lawyer as insurance adjustor); see also VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics,
Legal Ethics Op. 1218 (1989) (disbursing fees earned prior to lawyer's suspension).
11. 233 Va. 560, 357 S.E.2d 544 (1987).
12. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-102(A)(4) (1983) (amended 1989).
This rule, as in effect up to the 1989 amendment, provided that "[t]he prosecutor in a crimi-
nal case or a government lawyer shall [d]isclose to a defendant all information required by
law." Id.; see also Mims, Disclosure Not Required But Justice Still Prevails: United States
v. Trimper, 2 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1003 (1989).
13. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor required to disclose all excul-
patory material to defendant).
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tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the
offense, or reduce the punishment.1 4
Thus, whereas prosecutor Read's failure to disclose the changed
testimony to the defendant's counsel until after the close of the
Commonwealth's case in chief did not violate the unamended DR
8-102(A)(4), the new rule would have allowed the Disciplinary
Board to find that Read's conduct was improper.
5. Attorney Subpoenas
In response to the potential for abuse of discretion by prosecu-
tors,15 a new section was added to DR 8-102 which requires a pros-
ecutor to seek prior judicial approval before issuing a subpoena for
an attorney to testify and provide evidence concerning a person
who is or was represented by the attorney/witness.1 6 The amended
Virginia rule is similar to one enacted by Massachusetts 17 and was
adopted following the passage of a resolution on the matter by the
American Bar Association.' It is specifically applicable to grand
jury proceedings, further strengthening protections afforded to a
client's confidences and secrets. Federal prosecutors have chal-
lenged the amendment on grounds that it violates the supremacy
clause in that it attempts to regulate the subpoena power of the
federal government. 9 The federal prosecutors' request for repeal
was denied by the Supreme Court of Virginia in January, 1989.20
14. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-102(4)(1989).
15. A balance must be struck between the lawyer's ethical duty to preserve client confi-
dences and his obligation to appear before the court in response to a subpoena. Such disclo-
sure or testimony and the resultant requirements for the lawyer's withdrawal from the case
may encourage prosecutors to utilize such demands in an effort to preclude a lawyer's par-
ticipation in a case. See Williams v. District Court El Paso County, 700 P.2d 549 (Colo.
1985) (court required prosecution to show a compelling need for the lawyer's evidence that
cannot be satisfied from some other source).
16. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-102(A)(5) (1987). This rule states
that the prosecutor in a criminal case or a government lawyer shall "[niot subpoena an
attorney in any criminal case or proceeding, including any proceeding before any grand jury,
without prior judicial approval in circumstances where the prosecutor seeks to compel the
attorney/witness to provide evidence concerning a person who is or was represented by the
attorney witness." Id.
17. MASS. Sup. CT. R. 3:08.
18. [Current Reports] 2 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct. (ABA/BNA) 35 (Feb. 19, 1986).




6. Interest on Trust Fund Accounts
Disciplinary Rule 9-10221 permits an attorney to deposit client
trust funds into interest bearing accounts provided the interest is
either transmitted to the client in accordance with procedures for
computation and payment 22 or remitted by the bank directly to
the Virginia Law Foundation ("VLF").23 Additional subsections to
DR 9-102 became effective December 1, 1988 which make remit-
tances to the VLF automatic unless the lawyer follows procedures
permitting him to opt-out of the program. 4 Notice of election not
to participate in the VLF must be submitted within ninety days of
admission to the Bar and a lawyer may withdraw from participa-
tion on July 1 of any year by submitting the appropriate notice
during the preceding June.25 DR 9-102 also provides that a lawyer
who does not receive client funds may receive an exemption from
the requirement. 26 Although the new sections are very precise, DR
9-102(J) indicates that failure to comply with the procedures shall
not subject an attorney to disciplinary action under the Rules. 21
B. Organization and Government of the Bar
1. Proceedings Upon Adjudication of a Crime
A revision to Paragraph 13 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of
Virginia,28 which govern the organization and operation of the Bar,
was adopted to prevent an attorney from practicing law after hav-
ing been convicted of a crime. The revision to Paragraph 13 pro-
vides for a "summary suspension" wherein the attorney's license
may be suspended by the Disciplinary Board upon proof that the
attorney has been found guilty of a crime by verdict of a judge or
jury, irrespective of whether sentencing has occurred.29 Under the
former rule, action by the Disciplinary Board could not occur until
the entry of a conviction order generally following imposition of a
sentence. For example, in United States v. McAfee, 0 under the
21. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102 (1983).
22. Id. DR 9-102(D).
23. Id. DR 9-102(E).
24. Id. DR 9-102(G)-(J) (1989).
25. Id. DR 9-102(B).
26. Id.
27. Id. DR 9-102(J).
28. VA. Sup. CT. R. pt. 6, § IV, 113(D).
29. Id.
30. No. 87-00018-R (W.D. Va. Sept. 9, 1988).
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former rule, a lawyer continued to represent clients pending the
judge's imposition of a sentence for the lawyer's convictions, 31
whereas similar circumstances utilizing the provision for summary
suspension would now result in an immediate cessation of the con-
victed lawyer's practice.
2. Mandatory Professionalism Course
Active members of the Bar have been required for some time to
complete a four-hour course on the revised Code in order to main-
tain active Bar membership status. The amended rule of court now
mandates that new admittees and any other member changing to
an active membership status must complete a course on both the
Code and the lawyer's broader professional obligations.2
C. Statutory Change: Renumbering; Protection of Client Inter-
ests When Attorney is Disabled, Absent, Deceased, Suspended or
Disbarred
The 1988 session of the Virginia General Assembly changed Ti-
tle 54 of the Code of Virginia to Title 54.1."' Although most sec-
tions were simply renumbered, a new section was enacted permit-
ting Bar counsel, the chairman of a district committee of the
Virginia State Bar, or any interested party to petition the appro-
priate circuit court to appoint an attorney to inventory the files of
a disabled, absent, deceased, suspended or disbarred attorney. 4
The appointed attorney is directed to. "take whatever action seems
indicated to protect the interests of clients until such time as the
clients have had an opportunity to obtain substitute counsel."35
The appointed attorney will be bound by the attorney-client privi-
lege and shall be entitled to recover costs and a reasonable fee
which would be entered as judgment against the original attorney
or his estate.6
31. See In re McAfee, No. 88-000-0954 (VSB Disciplinary Board, Sept. 1988) (McAfee
was convicted in federal district court of criminal offenses including interstate travel to
commit a crime and concealment of the existence of currency from the Department of
Treasury).
32. VA. Sup. CT. R. pt. 6, § IV, 1 13.1.
33. 1988 Va. Acts 765.
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3900.01 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
35. Id. § 54.1-3900.01(A).
36. Id. § 54.1-3900.01(A),(B).
756 [Vol. 23:751
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III. RECENT VIRGINIA DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
A. Advancing Financial Assistance to Clients
Disciplinary Rule 5-103(B) 37 prohibits a lawyer from advancing
or guaranteeing financial assistance to a client during the course of
representation, in order to prevent the lawyer's judgment from be-
ing clouded by his interest in recouping the funds.3 8 In Shea v.
Virginia State Bar, attorney Kevin P. Shea, while representing a
seaman in a personal injury matter, advanced more than $6,000 of
his personal funds to the seaman for household expenses and auto-
mobile payments. 9 Shea conceded that this violated the applicable
DR, but he appealed the ninety-day suspension imposed by the
Disciplinary Board on several grounds. Among other contentions,
Shea argued that: (1) there was a widespread and long-standing
practice within the maritime plaintiff's bar which involved advanc-
ing living expenses to clients; (2) many other lawyers were guilty of
the same violation, yet he alone was being singled out for discipli-
nary action; and (3) he was unaware that he was violating the
DRs.4
In a tersely worded opinion, the Supreme Court of Virginia re-
jected Shea's arguments and held that "[e]very lawyer in Virginia
is expected to be fully aware of each and every disciplinary rule."4'
The court added that "[a]ny lawyer who violates the disciplinary
rules must stand ready to bear the individual consequences of that
violation regardless of what others were doing."4 2 The court upheld
Shea's ninety-day suspension.43
B. Improper Personal Injury Representation
In ordering a five-year suspension of attorney Bruce Britton, the
Disciplinary Board found infractions in three separate personal in-
jury cases handled by Britton." In one case, Britton represented a
37. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B) (1983).
38. Id.
39. 236 Va. 442, 443, 374 S.E.2d 63, 64 (1988).
40. Id. at 444, 374 S.E.2d at 64.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1155 (1988); see also VSB Comm.
on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Ops. 1219, 1248 (1988).
44. Virginia State Bar ex rel. Tenth Dist. Comm. v. Britton, Nos. 88-102-0855, 88-102-
0853, 88-102-0166 (VSB Disciplinary Board, Apr. 21, 1989).
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woman who had been injured while a passenger in her mother's
car. 45 Britton, with full knowledge that his client's mother was rep-
resented by an attorney, met with her in direct violation of the
DRs.46
In the second case, Britton's client was being treated by a physi-
cian for injuries received in an automobile accident, when he was
involved in a second accident. Britton told his client not to reveal
anything of the first accident to the doctor providing treatment for
the second injuries and similarly instructed the client not to in-
form the first doctor of the second accident or of the treatment he
was receiving for those injuries. The Board found Britton's instruc-
tions to his client constituted a wrongful act and involved dishon-
esty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation which reflected adversely
on his fitness to practice law.41
In the third case, Britton misrepresented settlement offers made
to his client, failed to withdraw following his discharge by the cli-
ent, and failed to keep his client informed on the matter of the
litigation.4 s
In the second and third cases, although the Board specifically
found Britton to have engaged in dishonest, fraudulent, or deceit-
ful conduct, the cumulative effect of his ethical improprieties was
clearly a factor in the severity of the sanctions imposed.
C. Fiduciary Responsibilities
In Virginia State Bar ex rel. Second District Committee v.
Gay,49 the Disciplinary Board ordered a three year suspension
based on an attorney's extraordinary manipulation of funds en-
trusted to him for investment purposes. Although not squarely
within the scope of an attorney-client relationship, the Board
found that Gay's personal and investment use of funds from an
account set up in trust for his client, Mrs. Williams, his lack of any
substantial accounting to her, and his failure to disgorge the assets
under his control when requested to do so violated numerous rules
45. Id. No. 88-102-0166.
46. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(A)(1)(1983). This Rule prohibits
a lawyer from communicating with an adverse party, whom the lawyer knows to be repre-
sented in the matter by an attorney, without the prior consent of the adverse party's attor-
ney. Id.
47. Virginia State Bar ex rel. Tenth Dist. Comm. v. Britton, No. 88-102-0853.
48. Id. No. 88-102-0855.
49. No. 87-0279 (VSB Disciplinary Board, Apr. 26, 1989).
[Vol. 23:751
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requiring the lawyer to attend to a client's matters promptly and
to keep a client reasonably informed about the matters at hand. In
addition, Gay failed to adhere to the appropriate recordkeeping
procedures required under DR 9-102 and DR 9-103. The Board
found:
a continuing course of dealing with Mrs. Williams' funds in a man-
ner calculated to avoid or delay the day when [he] would be called
upon to satisfy an acknowledged personal liability if [the company
to which he had loaned the trust funds] were unable to pay its obli-
gations. Mr. Gay put himself in the position of having this personal
liability by his own improper dealing with Mrs. Williams' money
and attempted to protect himself by the continued misuse of her
funds.5 0
Although ultimate restitution was made to Mrs. Williams, the
Board, citing Delk v. Virginia State Bar51 and Maddy v. First Dis-
trict Commission of the Virginia State Bar,52 articulated that "the
Bar is not required to establish actual loss of a client's funds to
justify a suspension in a trust account case. '5 3
IV. ISSUES OF NATIONAL CONCERN
A. Mandatory Reporting of Lawyer Misconduct
The delicate balance between an attorney's duty as an officer of
the court and his duties to his client was re-defined by the recent
Supreme Court of Illinois decision, In re Himmel.54 A client en-
gaged Himmel to seek restitution from another lawyer who had
represented the client in a personal injury matter and had con-
verted the settlement proceeds. The client, Ms. Forsberg, had spe-
cifically requested that Himmel not pursue any disciplinary pro-
ceedings against the first attorney, Casey, since she preferred not
to dilute her chances for recovery by any possible sanction. Him-
50. Gay, No. 87-0279, slip op. at 12.
51. 233 Va. 187, 355 S.E.2d 558 (1987). The court stated that loss of money by a client is
not a prerequisite to the suspension of a attorney's license for mishandling the client's
money. Additionally, it is not necessary to show moral turpitude on the part of the attorney.
Id. at 191-92, 355 S.E.2d at 561.
52. 205 Va. 652, 139 S.E.2d 56 (1964). The court stated that even if none of an attorney's
clients suffered "any prejudice to his legal rights," the attorney will not be exonerated in
disbarment proceedings. Id. at 658, 139 S.E.2d at 61.
53. Gay, No. 87-0279, slip op. at 13.
54. 125 Ill.2d 531, 533 N.E.2d 790 (1988).
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mel and Casey reached an agreement which provided for payment
to Forsberg of more than the original amount converted. Under the
terms of the negotiated settlement, Forsberg agreed not to initiate
any criminal, civil or disciplinary action against Casey. Casey failed
to perform the agreement to repay Forsberg and Himmel insti-
tuted suit for the breach. Judgment was entered against Casey, but
the matter came to the attention of the Illinois Attorney Registra-
tion and Disciplinary Commission which began proceedings against
Himmel for having failed to report Casey's misconduct.15 The Illi-
nois Attorney Discipline Hearing Board found that Himmel had
violated Illinois DR 1-103(a) 5' and recommended a private repri-
mand. The Bar, apparently seeking a stronger sanction, appealed
to the Review Board which found no violation and recommended
dismissal of the complaint.5 The Bar then appealed to the Su-
preme Court of Illinois which reinstated Himmel's DR 1-103(a) vi-
olation and imposed a one-year suspension. 8 The courts also held
that Forsberg's report to Himmel of Casey's misconduct was not
privileged information since Forsberg discussed it with her mother
and fiance present. 9
Considerable consternation has followed the Himmel decision.
Himmel's sanction may be viewed as encouraging the self-regula-
tory aspect of the profession, but the opinion apparently disre-
gards the attorney's duty to maintain his client's confidentiality or
to zealously represent her in an attempt to secure the best possible
result. The court emphasizes the fact that the lawyer's ethical re-
sponsibilities under the DRs may not be disregarded simply be-
cause the client instructs the lawyer to do so.6 °
Virginia's DR 1-103(A) is similar in substance to the Illinois rule,
55. Id. at -, 533 N.E.2d at 791.
56. ILL. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(a) (1980) reads: "A lawyer pos-
sessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of Rule 1-102(a)(3) or (4) shall report such
knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such
violation."
Rule 1-102 reads:
(a) A lawyer shall not ...
(3) engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude;
(4) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; or
(5) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Id. DR 1-102.
57. 125 Ill.2d at -, 533 N.E.2d at 792.
58. Id. at , 533 N.E.2d at 795-96.




but requires mandatory reporting of another lawyer's violation of
the DRs only when the violation "raises a substantial question as
to that lawyer's fitness to practice law in other respects."'" Two
early Legal Ethics Opinions have addressed the mandatory report-
ing issue in Virginia. Although Legal Ethics Opinions are advisory
only and not binding on any court or tribunal, they are generally
viewed as instructive. Legal Ethics Opinion 497 holds that "it is
not improper for an attorney who during the course of his repre-
sentation, determines that his client's former attorney violated the
Code, to refrain from disclosing the violations when such disclosure
would adversely affect his client's interests and the client has not
consented to the disclosure." 2 Stated even more emphatically, Le-
gal Ethics Opinion 217 finds that "[uft is improper for an attorney
to report to the Bar information concerning unethical conduct by
another attorney when such information was obtained from a cli-
ent in confidence and the client refuses to consent to the disclosure
thereof."6 3 However, both Opinion 497 and Opinion 217 were is-
sued by the Bar's Standing Committee on Legal Ethics prior to the
1983 Code revision. The earlier Code adopted by the Supreme
Court of Virginia in 1970 did not include the current language of
DR 1-103(A) which requires reporting only where the violation
raises a substantial question as to the offending lawyer's fitness to
practice law in other respects.
B. Advertising/Solicitation
1. Targeted Direct Mail
Last year, the United States Supreme Court extended the appli-
cation of commercial speech protections to one more area of lawyer
advertising, continuing the line of cases which began with Bates v.
61. DR 1-103(A) of the Code states:
A lawyer having information indicating that another lawyer has committed a viola-
tion of the Disciplinary Rules that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's
fitness to practice law in other respects, shall report such information to the appro-
priate professional authority, except as provided in DR 4-101.
VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(A)(1983); see VSB Comm. on Legal
Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 497 (1983).
62. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 497 (1983).
63. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 217 (1982); but see Maryland State
Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 89-46, [Current Reports] 5 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 186 (June 21, 1989) (under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the cli-
ent's desire for confidentiality may preclude the lawyer from revealing the client's prior
lawyer's misconduct).
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State Bar of Arizona6 4 and including In re R.M.J., 5 and Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of The Supreme Court of Ohio. 6
The major limitation imposed thus far on lawyer self-promotion is
the limitation regarding in-person solicitation. When an attorney
outrageously overreached and attempted to coerce two accident
victims to engage him for personal injury representation, the Court
found in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association6 7 that states may
categorically ban lawyer in-person solicitation to protect the
public. 8
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,6 9 Richard Shapero, a
Kentucky lawyer, requested that the Kentucky Attorneys Adver-
tising Commission approve a solicitation letter he proposed send-
ing to individuals against whom home foreclosure suits had been
filed. Although it found that the letter was neither misleading nor
false, the Commission refused to approve the letter based upon the
applicable Kentucky DR which prohibited the targeting of direct
mail advertising to a specific group of potential clients.70
The Supreme Court of Kentucky replaced the rule with the ABA
Model Rule 7.3, 71 but upheld the ban on Shapero's targeted direct
mail advertising. By analogy to Ohralik, the Court found that po-
tential clients who need specific legal services were easily abused. 2
In reversing that decision and remanding the case to the Supreme
Court of Kentucky, the Court found that the targeted direct mail
64. 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (lawyer advertising protected by first amendment).
65. 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (lawyer mail advertising to potential clients is protected).
66. 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (permitted solicitation of legal business through targeted newspa-
per advertising).
67. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
68. Id. at 468.
69. 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
70. Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.135(5)(b)(i). This Rule prohibits mailing or delivery of written ad-
vertisements "precipitated by a specific event. . . involving or relating to the addressee...
as distinct from the general public." Id.
71. The model rule reads:
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client with
whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail, in-person
or otherwise, when significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuni-
ary gain. The term "solicit" includes contact in person, by telephone or telegraph, by
letter or other writing, or by other communication directed to a specific recipient, but
does not include letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed generally to
persons not known to need legal services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a
particular matter, but who are so situated that they might in general find such ser-
vices useful.
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1987).
72. Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1921-22.
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letter presented no risk of overreaching comparable to that of the
in-person solicitation banned under Ohralik73 since "a letter, like a
printed advertisement (but unlike a lawyer) can readily be put in a
drawer to be considered later, ignored, or discarded." '74
In Virginia, DR 2-101(A)75 permits all manner of public commu-
nication for the purpose of lawyer advertising unless the communi-
cation contains a "false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive state-
ment or claim. ' 76 In applying what is surely one of the broadest
such rules in the country, Legal Ethics Opinions have been issued
approving of targeted direct mail campaigns to all persons recently
charged with criminal offenses 77 and to individuals whose homes
are subject to foreclosure. 78 Similarly, a Maryland Legal Ethics
Opinion recently found that targeted direct mail announcements of
legal services to individuals against whom the Internal Revenue
Service had filed a notice of tax lien were not inherently unethical
under the applicable rule. 7
9
2. In-Person Solicitation
Although Ohralik was based upon the overreaching in-person so-
licitation by one lawyer in a hospital setting with an ordinary per-
sonal injury victim, the issue of in-person solicitation now fre-
quently deals with lawyers' activities at the scenes of mass
disasters. States which prohibit in-person solicitation,80 bans which
are permitted if not encouraged by Ohralik, sometimes take asser-
tive measures to guard against improper activities immediately fol-
lowing a mass disaster. When extensive improper solicitations took
place following a major air crash in Dallas, the Bar recognized the
need for averting such behavior. Consequently, within hours of a
second crash two years later, Texas State Bar officials arrived at
73. Id. at 1924.
74. Id. at 1923.
75. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A)(1983).
76. Id.
77. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 862 (1986).
78. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 904 (1987); see also VSB Comm. on
Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 579 (1984) (solicitation of persons charged with driving while
intoxicated); VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 625 (1984) (all forms of acci-
dent victim solicitation permissible, if not false, fraudulent, or deceptive, and without sub-
stantial potential for coercion or harassment).
79. Maryland State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 88-27, [Current Reports] 4 Law.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 25 (Feb. 17, 1988).
80. See, e.g., TEXAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1989).
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the scene to provide assistance and guard against a second round
of unacceptable solicitation. Similarly, to counteract the activities
of Hawaiian lawyers who were paying airline employees to dis-
tribute the lawyers' business cards, the Hawaii State Bar Associa-
tion placed newspaper advertisements which outlined the Bar's
anti-solicitation rules and described how to report disciplinary
violations.8'
Virginia DR 2-103(A), s2 regarding in-person solicitation, is con-
siderably more permissive than Ohralik might indicate. However,
it does prohibit such solicitation if:
(1) Such communication contains a false, fraudulent, misleading,
or deceptive statement or claim; or
(2) Such communication has a substantial potential for or involves
the use of coercion, duress, compulsion, intimidation, threats, un-
warranted promises of benefits, over-persuasion, overreaching, or
vexatious or harassing conduct, taking into account the sophistica-
tion regarding legal matters, the physical, emotional or mental state
of the person to whom the communication is directed and the cir-
cumstances in which the communication is made.83
In response to the increasing ethical problems regarding in-person
solicitation, an ad hoc committee, appointed to serve during 1989-
90 by Bar President Philip B. Morris, will review the current broad
disciplinary rules permitting such activities.
3. Certified Trial Specialist Denotation
The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari of
a case in which an Illinois lawyer appealed the censure imposed for
his letterhead indicating that he is a "Certified Trial Specialist By
the National Board of Trial Advocacy." 4 Parallel to Virginia's
rule,85 Illinois DR 2-105(a) precludes an attorney from holding
himself out as a specialist except in the areas of patents, trade-
81. See Moss, Race to Flight 1141, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1988 at 30; [Current Reports] 4 Law
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 211-12 (July 6, 1988); [Current Reports] 5 Law. Man.
on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 37 (Feb. 15, 1989)..
82. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1983).
83. Id.
84. In re Peel, 126 Ill.2d 397, 534 N.E.2d 980 (1989), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3851 (U.S.
July 3, 1989) (No. 88-1775).
85. See VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104 (1983).
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marks, or admiralty.8 6 In In re Peel, the Supreme Court of Illinois
held that the use of the term "Certified Trial Specialist" was mis-
leading and therefore improper since the state bar does not have
provisions for recognizing such certifications. s7 At least two other
state courts, however, have held that a blanket prohibition on
claiming the same certified designation would violate the first
amendment."" Thus, the Supreme Court's examination of In re
Peel will add yet another dimension to the lawyer advertising
picture.
C. Involuntary Court Appointments
No specific DR demands that a lawyer assist the profession to
fulfill its duty of making legal counsel available, but Ethical Con-
sideration ("EC") 2-2789 entreats the lawyer to "find time to par-
ticipate in serving the disadvantaged" who are unable to pay rea-
sonable legal feesY0 Similarly, EC 2-3191 encourages the lawyer not
to seek to be excused, except for compelling reasons, from under-
taking court appointments or bar association requests to represent
a person unable to obtain counsel for either financial or other rea-
sons.2 Among factors not considered compelling are: the repug-
nance of the proceeding's subject matter; the identity or position
of a person involved in the case; the lawyer's belief that a criminal
defendant is guilty; and the lawyer's belief regarding the merits of
a civil case. 3
For more than fifty years, courts have based their demands that
lawyers accept involuntary appointments on the lawyer's role as an
officer of the court. This role carries with it the obligations of ser-
vice to the profession, the court, and those unable to pay legal
fees.94 An appointment which would, however, cause the lawyer to
violate his ethical responsibilities would presumably not be accept-
able since adherence to the Code would override the lawyer's duty
86. ILL. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-105(a) (1980).
87. 126 Ill.2d at -, 534 N.E.2d at 984-86.
88. See Ex parte Howell, 487 So. 2d 848 (Ala. 1986); In re Johnson, 341 N.W.2d 282
(Minn. 1983).
89. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-27 (1983).
90. Id.
91. Id. EC 2-31.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633
(9th Cir. 1965).
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as an officer of the court. Thus, if the acceptance of the court ap-
pointment would result in a conflict of interest or in providing rep-
resentation in an area in which one was not competent, the court
might find those to be compelling reasons to refuse the
appointment.
The recent Mallard v. United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa95 decision held that a federal court may
not require an attorney to accept an appointment. The Supreme
Court read section 1915(d) of the United States Code96 as contain-
ing merely "precatory" language allowing the court to "request" an
attorney to represent any person claiming in forma pauperis
status.9 7
In resolving the apparent conflict between the circuits over
whether section 1915(d) permits compulsory assignments to attor-
neys in civil cases, 98 the Court's opinion included an extensive dis-
cussion of both semantics and legislative history. The majority
opinion did not address the underlying ethical precepts regarding
involuntary assignments. Justice Stevens' dissent, however, ex-
pressed some indignation that the decision was based on the mere
"parsing of the plain meaning of the work 'request.' 99 Although
the dissent recognized several circumstances which could provide
appropriate reasons for a lawyer to decline to accept an appoint-
ment, it emphasized the tradition of the bar to provide representa-
tion to the indigent, and preferred to construe "request" to mean
"respectfully command."'100
95. 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989). Attorney Mallard had been requested to represent three in-
mates of an Iowa correctional facility in their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against prison officials.
Their suit alleged that false disciplinary reports had been filed against them, that they had
been mistreated physically, and that their lives had been endangered by exposing them as
informants. After appointment, the attorney filed a motion to withdraw, claiming that he
had no familiarity with the legal issues and that he lacked trial experience. Although he
offered to provide services to indigent litigants in bankruptcy and securities law, his claimed
areas of expertise, his motion was denied by a magistrate. He appealed to the district court,
claiming that the forced representation would cause him to violate his ethical obligations
regarding competence. He also alleged that the court. did not have the requisite authority
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) to require his service. The district court affirmed the magistrate's
decision and found Mallard competent to serve. Mallard then sought and was denied a writ
of mandamus by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982). This section states that "[tihe court may request an attor-
ney to represent any such person unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the
allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious." Id.
97. 109 S. Ct. at 1818.
98. Id. at 1817.
99. Id. at 1823 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 1826 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In Boone v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
used similar reasoning and granted a lawyer's motion for leave to
withdraw from a case, in which he had been involuntarily ap-
pointed, to pursue an appeal for a criminal defendant."' Attorney
Woodward had consistently refused to accept court appointments
to represent indigent criminal defendants and did not allow his
name to be placed on the rotation list maintained in his circuit,
although his expertise and practice is almost exclusively in the
area of criminal defense. He had represented defendant Boone
through the sentencing phase of his trial for breaking and entering
and petit larceny although neither Boone nor his mother had
honored promises to pay Woodward's fees on a regular basis. When
Judge Bagnell appointed Woodward, over his objections, counsel
for the indigent Boone, Woodward moved to have attorney Over-
ton, who was on the court appointment list, appointed co-coun-
sel.102 Since jurisdiction was unclear, Woodward filed petitions in
both the Supreme Court of Virginia and the Court of Appeals of
Virginia for a writ of prohibition to preclude the trial judge from
compelling him to represent the defendant on appeal. Under dif-
ferent rationale, both applications were denied, but the defend-
ant's appeal of the criminal conviction had by then reached the
court of appeals.103 Woodward moved the appellate court for leave
to withdraw and relief was granted by a two-to-one decision which
found, in addition to the fact that the defendant was represented
by competent and willing co-counsel, that Woodward had never
expressed a willingness to accept an appointment to represent the
appellant. 4 The plain language of the statute permitting appoint-
ment requires that the attorney indicate his willingness to accept
such an appointment. 05
Although attorneys Mallard and Woodward were discharged
from involuntary court appointments based, at least in part, on the
101. No. 0761-88-1 (Va. App. Dec. 8, 1988) (order granting co-counsel leave to withdraw).
102. Petitioner's Memorandum in Support of Application for Writ of Prohibition at 2, In
re Woodward, No. 880859 (Va. July 27, 1988).
103. Woodward had also moved for a temporary restraining order in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, but asked that court to suspend any
ruling pending any relief granted by the Court of Appeals of Virginia.
104. Boone v. Virginia, No. 0761-88-1 (Va. App. Dec. 8, 1988) (order granting Woodward
permission to withdraw).
105. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-159 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
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plain reading of the applicable statute, other cases on the subject
are winding their way through the courts on other theories. Nu-
merous state supreme courts have addressed the situation over the
years in terms of constitutional issues, several holding that the
minimal fees paid court-appointed lawyers become confiscatory in
nature in that the fees do not even cover the lawyer's overhead,
and therefore, the individual lawyer is involuntarily subsidizing the
system." 6 Equal protection clause arguments have also been made
claiming that the provision of counsel for indigent defendants
should not be provided at the expense of only this particular group
of citizens, those admitted to the bar, and most particularly those
practicing in the less populated areas of a given state.1 07
Finally, it has recently been held that a lawyer's bald statement
that he was incompetent to handle a case to which he was ap-
pointed was insufficient to warrant his removal. The Supreme
Court of Colorado assigned the burden of proving incompetence to
the lawyer, then allowed the court to determine if, under Canon
six, the lawyer is capable of becoming competent by his own study
and preparation or if the circumstances warrant appointment of
co-counsel until the lawyer becomes competent.10 s
D. Bar Membership Issues
1. Residency Requirements
The United States Supreme Court recently handed down two
decisions, less than nine months apart, which struck down specific
residency requirements for bar membership. In Supreme Court of
Virginia v. Friedman,10 9 the Court found that no valid reason sup-
ported Virginia's requirement that a foreign attorney seeking ad-
mission to the Bar by reciprocity without examination be a resi-
dent' of the Commonwealth. The Court held the requirement
unconstitutional since the privileges and immunities clause of the
106. See DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987); State ex rel. Ste-
phan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816 (1987); Jewell v. Maynard, No. 18320 (W. Va.
Apr. 26, 1989), [Current Reports] 5 Law Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 165-66 (June
7, 1989); see also Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735
(1980). But see Huskey v. State, No. 87-05-I (Tenn. Jan. 11, 1988), [Current Reports] 4 Law.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 22-23 (Feb. 3, 1988).
107. 242 Kan. at -, 747 P.2d at 843-46.
108. Stern v. Grand County Ct., No. 87SA-354 (Colo. May 22, 1989), [Current Reports] 5
Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 200 (July 5, 1989).
109. 108 S. Ct. 2260 (1988). See generally Note, Invalidation of Residency Requirements
for Admission to the Bar: Opportunities for General Reform, 23 U. RICH. L. REV. 231 (1989).
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Constitution protects a nonresident's interest in practicing law on
terms of substantial equality with those enjoyed by residents. The
Court found that Virginia's requirement, that an attorney admit-
ted by waiver maintain an office in the state, was sufficient to sat-
isfy the state's full-time practice requirement without need to ad-
ditionally require residency.
During its next term, the Court followed earlier decisions, 110 and
found that the residency requirements for membership in the Vir-
gin Islands Bar also violated the privileges and immunities
clause."' There, the bar association argued that the distinctive na-
ture of the Islands' distance from the mainland presented extenu-
ating circumstances which required lawyers to have resided in the
Virgin Islands for at least one year immediately preceding the law-
yer's proposed admission to the bar.12 The Court found a variety
of options available to protect Island clients, including resident co-
counsel arrangements and substitution for acceptance of
mandatory court appointments.1 3 Furthermore, the Court dis-
agreed with the argument that members of the Virgin Islands Bar
living in distant states would create extraordinary problems for the
bar to regulate local ethics codes." 4 Rather, the Court found the
monitoring problems faced by that bar to be no more problematic
than those faced by any mainland state with limited resources. 115
2. Mandatory Bar Membership
In Levine v. Hefferman, 1 6 the Seventh Circuit upheld a Wiscon-
sin law requiring lawyers to join the Wisconsin Bar as a condition
for practicing law in that state. The court held that such
mandatory membership did not violate lawyers' first amendment
rights not to associate and not to speak." 7 In Hollar v. Virgin Is-
lands Bar Association,'" the Third Circuit denied a similar claim
by a group of Virgin Islands lawyers who also alleged that their
110. See Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987); Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S.
274 (1985).
111. Barnard v. Thorstenn, 57 U.S.L.W. 4316 (U.S. March 6, 1989) (Nos. 87-1939 and 87-
2008).
112. Id. at 4318.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 4319.
115. Id.
116. 864 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1988), rev'g 679 F. Supp. 1478 (1988).
117. Id.
118. 857 F.2d 163 (3rd Cir. 1988).
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first amendment rights were being violated by mandatory bar
membership requirements. That circuit also reiterated the decision
in Lathrop v. Donohue"19 permitting an integrated bar, and dis-
missed summarily allegations that several bar activities, including
social events, were ultra vires.2 ° It did, however, find that it was
ultra vires for the bar to take a public position regarding a nomi-
nee for United States Attorney. 2'
V. CONCLUSION
Considerable uneasiness revolves around the ethical behavior of
lawyers. Members of the bar and the judiciary are uneasy that the
pragmatic demands of operating a law practice sometimes lead to
ill-considered activities while the general public appears to uneas-
ily vacillate between lawyer-bashing humor and outrage at the le-
gal system. Public perception of the legal profession is not en-
hanced by a lawyer's infraction of either the law or the Code,
whether in the form of crass advertising, breach of a client's trust
or confidentiality, or advising a client to misrepresent the facts.
Tension sometimes exists between the lawyer's responsibilities
as an officer of the court and as an advocate for his client. The
organized bar, in an effort to be responsive to its role in protecting
the public from unscrupulous lawyers, treats both the ethical
precepts and the disciplinary system as fluid and subject to modifi-
cation. In providing a code of ethics, the bar provides guidance to
the lawyer as he sorts out his varying roles and responsibilities.
The questions which have been asked in the past two years have
provided guidance in the areas of advertising and solicitation,
mandatory reporting of another lawyer's misconduct even if doing
so results in less zealous representation of a client, accepting court
appointments even where the lawyer's expertise is less than desira-
ble, revealing client confidences to a grand jury, and the level of
responsibility a lawyer accepts in providing services to an individ-
ual outside the attorney-client relationship. The answers may, in
some situations, need refinement in order to assist the lawyer to
conform his conduct to appropriate standards.
119. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).




The law of professional responsibility, as other fields of law, has
few, if any, "black letter rules." Variations in circumstances may
require variations in behavior. Furthermore, considering the multi-
jurisdictional law practiced by many lawyers today, the variability
of the ethical requirements from state to state present even greater
challenges. The United States Supreme Court is being called upon
more frequently to resolve splits among states 2 or circuits,123 and
it appears that some form of nationally-accepted standards of con-
duct for the legal profession may be one way to avoid some of the
abounding uneasiness currently experienced both within and
outside the bar.
122. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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